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A COMMENT ON PROFESSOR BUELL’S PAPER 
Charles Yablon* 
Let me start by saying how much I enjoyed reading Professor 
Buell’s article.1  It provoked the same reaction I get with many other 
pieces I find powerful and thought provoking.  It caused me to ask: 
“Why don’t I agree with this piece?”  A lot of what Professor Buell says 
seems to me cogent, clear, and eminently correct, but at other times it 
strikes me as, if not wrong, at least difficult to fully endorse.  My 
problem is that I am not entirely clear how strong a claim Professor 
Buell is making with regard to his “badges of fraud.”  He could be 
saying that these “badges of fraud” are simply a way of explicating the 
complex process of exercising prosecutorial discretion, and that these 
“badges of fraud” are just one important factor that prosecutors analyze 
in their multi-faceted decision as to whether or not to prosecute any 
given fraud claim.  If Professor Buell is only making this relatively 
modest assertion, he and I have little to disagree over. 
But it seems to me that Professor Buell frequently makes a much 
stronger assertion, that the “badges of fraud” represent either a 
necessary or a sufficient condition for the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion to bring a criminal fraud claim.  Either of these claims strikes 
me as problematic.  It clearly cannot be a sufficient condition just to see 
one of these badges of fraud in an investigation.  Take concealment.  
Obviously there is lots of concealment by corporate managers that does 
not give rise to actionable fraud.  CEOs can conceal adulterous affairs.  
They can conceal deals that have not quite reached fruition.  There is, in 
short, a lot of information which they might be subjectively 
surreptitious about, maybe even subjectively feel quite guilty about, and 
which shareholders would find extremely interesting, but we would not 
say that every instance of such concealment, surreptitious conduct or 
subjective guilt, without more, constitutes actionable criminal fraud. 
To say that the badges of fraud represent a necessary condition for 
any criminal fraud prosecution also raises difficulties.  Professor Buell 
himself alluded to the major such problem when he observed that, as a 
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matter of actual practice, when the fraud is of a well-established variety, 
the courts will frequently presume mens rea or similar cognitive badges 
of fraud. 
So it would seem that Professor Buell’s badges of fraud are neither 
a necessary nor a sufficient condition, but maybe at most, a necessary 
condition for a criminal fraud prosecution when the fraud is of a novel 
or unusual type.  That may well be Professor Buell’s thesis.  But note 
that, if so, it comes close to being simply an assertion about one factor 
in a multi-factor test.  It says that when other factors favoring a criminal 
fraud prosecution are weak, the presence of “badges of fraud” may well 
be the deciding factor in favor of prosecution.  As a descriptive account 
of how prosecutors think about these matters, Professor Buell is very 
likely correct and surely has more insight into these matters than I can 
claim.  But Professor Buell is making not just a descriptive but a 
normative claim about these badges of fraud.  He is saying that these 
factors not only are, but should be, the deciding factor in at least some 
important category of criminal fraud prosecutions. 
As to this normative argument that badges of fraud should be, in 
effect, the test for determining whether or not to bring a novel or 
unusual fraud claim, I must confess that I have my doubts.  It seems to 
me there is enough flexibility in the fraud rules already, particularly 
given the open texture of the very concept of materiality, and the 
flexibility created by the fact that not only false statements, but 
omissions are actionable, that adding an additional potentially 
dispositive requirement of “badges of fraud” might well result in either 
over or under prosecution of corporate fraud cases. 
For an example of under-inclusion, take a quintessential case like 
Enron.  It is not inconceivable that, had the Enron management been a 
little more careful and a little better advised, they might have shown no 
badges of fraud whatsoever.  They could have set up their Special 
Purpose Entities perfectly and conformed with every single bit of 
GAAP, showing no surreptitious behavior or evidence of subjective 
guilt.  Yet given the flexibility of the concept of materiality under the 
federal securities laws, I believe they could still have been properly 
prosecuted for failing to fully disclose the underlying economic reality 
of those deals. 
Finally, I think that the badges of fraud concept is a powerful idea 
that will often work well in considering whether CEOs and other top 
corporate executives should be prosecuted for fraud, but there are two 
other important categories of potential defendants for whom the concept 
is less useful.  One is criminal wrongdoing by people at the middle or 
low level of the corporate hierarchy, rather than by CEOs or other top 
management.  That is, you may have criminal activity that was not run 
from the top of the hierarchy, but passively tolerated by that hierarchy, 
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with various levels of knowledge.  It seems to me that the badges of 
fraud concept may not be the most useful way of framing the 
prosecutorial decision in that context. 
The other important category is the criminal prosecution of 
corporate entities.  It seems to me that the function of criminal law with 
regard to corporate entities is quite different than that for human beings 
and that the badges of fraud concept is less helpful in dealing with non-
human defendants.  Rather, the focus of prosecutorial discretion in such 
cases should be on prospects of general deterrence, as well as avoiding 
unnecessary injury to relatively innocent third parties like employees 
and public shareholders.  Given these concerns, the prosecutor’s choice 
between criminal prosecution and civil penalties may be quite different 
with regard to corporations than it is with CEOs, who may be fully 
indemnified and have much shorter time horizons than investor or 
employee groups. 
 
